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Abstract  
We are increasingly aware of the role of emotions and emotional construction in social 
relationships. However, despite their significance, there are few constructs or theoretical 
approaches to the evolution of emotions that can be related to the prehistoric archaeological 
record. Whilst we frequently discuss how archaic humans might have thought, how they felt 
might seem to be beyond the realm of academic inquiry. In this paper we aim to open up the 
debate into the construction of emotion in early prehistory and propose key stages in the 
emotional motivation to help others, the feeling of compassion, in human evolution. We 
highlight what appear to be particularly significant thresholds for human social relationships 
and the evolution of the human mind.  
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Mind and emotion  
It is becoming increasingly apparent that emotions are central to human social relationships 
(Parkinson, Fischer and Manstead 2005, Nesse 2001, Evans 2001, Reddy 2001). Emotions 
structure decision making (Damasio 2000, Zeelenberg et al 2008) and link us in a web of 
shared understanding and concern (Baron-ŽŚĞŶĂŶĚtŚĞĞůƌŝŐŚƚ ? ? ? ? ) ?/ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ƐŽĐŝŽ-
ŵŽƌĂů ?ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶƐƐƵĐŚĂƐĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶ ?ůŽǀĞ, remorse, empathy, and guilt have been seen as 
ƚŚĞ ŬĞǇ ƋƵĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ƵƐ  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ?  ?EĞƐƐĞ  ? ? ? ? ? ǀĂŶƐ  ? ? ? ? ? WĂƌŬŝŶƐŽŶ ? &ŝƐĐŚĞƌ ĂŶĚ
Manstead 2005).  
Certainly the wealth, depth and interrelationships of human emotions mark us out 
distinctively from other species of higher primate. Yet archaeologists of early prehistory 
have been typically wary of discussing emotions and their role in archaic human societies. 
Emotions have been seen as nebulous and undefinable (Tarlow 2000) and so discussions of 
the development of emotions have remained largely detached from the archaeological 
evidence for how archaic humans behaved. Though there is evidence for archaic human 
behaviour from at least 2.3 million years ago we have been wary of making the link between 
behaviour, motivation and emotions, preferring to discuss clearly functional behaviour such 
as food procurement or butchery (Coward and Gamble 2008).  Though occasional finds of 
ĂƌĐŚĂŝĐŚƵŵĂŶƐǁŚŽĂƉƉĞĂƌƚŽŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶ ‘ĐĂƌĞĚĨŽƌ ?tĂůŬĞƌ ?ŝŵŵĞƌŵĂŶĂŶĚ>ĞĂŬĞǇ ? ? ? ? ?
Walker and Shipman 1996, Cameron and Groves 2004, Lordkipanidze et al 2005) have 
sparked questions about compassion in the past, these remain outside key archaeological 
enquiries with a lack of theoretical context in which to place them. Perhaps because 
emotions are seen as intangible and uniquely personal, early humans remain very much 
'hominins' in our discussions, obeying rational biological imperatives with little sense of any 
'human' emotions or feeling for others and giving us little sense of how such feelings 
evolved.  
   
As new ground is covered in understanding the development of more social areas of 
ĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůďƌĂŝŶ ?(Dunbar 2003; 2007, Dunbar and Schultz 2008) and in its 
application to the archaeological record (McNabb 2007, Gamble 2007, Coward and Gamble 
2008), the way is primed for a discussion of the archaeological evidence for the evolution of 
key 'human' emotions. The link between emotion, motivation and behaviour is also 
increasing understood (Mikulincer and Shaver 2005a, Zeelenberg 2008) particularly through 
recent neuroimaging studies of modern humans today (McCabe et al 2001, Oschner et al 
2004, Lemche et al 2006, Hee Kim and Hamann 2007). Moreover, the universality and 
biological basis of key emotions is increasingly clear.  
 
We now know that key emotional reactions follow universal patterns (Ekman 1992, Damasio 
2000, Parrott 2001, Evans 2001, Parkinson, Fischer and Manstead 2005) which draw on 
common neurological roots (Colombetti 2007, Dolan 2002, McCabe et al 2001, Oschner et al 
2004, Hee Kim and Hamann 2007). Thus though there are cultural differences in the 
ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶƐ ? ĂŶĚ ĂŶǇ ŽŶĞ ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ĨĞĞůŝŶŐ ŽĨ ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶ ǁŝůů ďĞ
distinct, it is increasingly clear that certain key emotions which structure human social 
relationships are found in all societies (Frank 1988, Nesse 2001, Damasio 2000: 50, Heinrich 
and Gil-White 2001, Evans 2001, Parkinson, Fischer and Manstead 2005, Wulff 2007). 
Parkinson, Fischer and Manstead (2005: 77) illustrate, for example, that shame is felt in 
subtly different ways within individualistic and collectivistic cultures. Shame in a collectivistic 
culture (such as Spain or China) is seen positively as an important emotion in restoring social 
harmony, whereas in individualistic cultures (America, Britain) shame is often associated 
with personal failure. However, the emotion serves a similar social function in each culture 
in limiting anti-social behaviour (Fiske 2002). Equally, pride is seen as a positive emotion in 
American culture and a negative one in Japan (Reddy 2001: 8), and in some cultures, such as 
amongst the Inuit, anger is clearly repressed (Briggs 1970). Culturally specific emotions, such 
as the Japanese amae - a kind of sweet dependance on people close to you (Markus and 
Kitayama 1999: 237, Parkinson, Fischer and Manstead 2005: 35, Doi 1973, Morsbach and 
Tyler 1986), do exist, but these are nonetheless based on common roots. It is clear that key 
emotions developed in an evolutionary context and play broadly similar social roles in 
cultures across the world from modern western societies to ethnographically documented 
ones (Ekman and Friesen 1971, Ekman 1992, Parrott 2001:  176, Parkinson, Fischer and 
Manstead 2005: 59, Wulff 2007: 41, Briggs 1998).  
 
Emotional construction and emotional reactions are as much part of the human mind as is 
linguistic or spatial abilities, and understanding the evolution of human emotions is as 
essential to comprehending the development of the human mind (Weisfeld and LaFreniere 
2007, Eder, Hommel and Houwer 2007, Zeelenberg 2008). 
  
Compassion 
Given the wealth of human emotions, it might seem difficult to focus on any particular key 
emotional expression. However certain emotions, particularly the socio-moral emotions 
such as empathy, compassion, shame and remorse, appear to be particularly socially 
significant. Of all of these compassion is perhaps the most evocative of something we feel 
ĚĞĨŝŶĞƐ ‘ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚƵƐƉĞƌŚĂƉƐƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞĨŽĐƵƐĨŽƌĂĚĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĂů
evidence for the construction of emotions in the past. Indeed, were we to consider one 
feeling which we might ask to know if our earliest ancestors felt it would surely be 
compassion. Compassion is associated with love, commitment to others, willing self sacrifice 
ĂŶĚĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐǁŚŝĐŚǁĞĨĞĞůŵĂŬĞƵƐ ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ?ĂŶĚƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞ us from other animals.  
Understanding the evolution and role of compassion in past human species entails 
recognising that compassion is more than just a feeling which we recognise as personal but 
also in a wider analytical perspective it is a biological response, a 'motivation to act' whose 
roots lie in the hormonal and neuronal working of our mind. Indeed alongside its poetic 
connections compassion can be scientifically understood. Compassion involves both feeling 
ĂŶĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞƚŽĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐĞŵŽƚŝŽŶ ?ĞŵƉĂƚŚŝƐŝŶŐ ? ?ĂƌŽŶ-Cohen and Wheelwright 
2004) and being motivated to help (Gilbert 2002, 2005, 2009). When we compassionately 
help others through a genuine motivation rather than obligation or for a selfish gain whether 
this be caring for someone who is hurt or responding to an infant (Gilbert 2002, 2005, 2009, 
Depue and Morrone-Strupinsky 2005), looking after pets (Odendaal and Meintjes 2003, 
Nagasawa et al 2009, Miller et al 2009) or even punishing cheats (DeQuervain et al 2004) a 
flood of oxytocin is released into the brain (Oschner et al 2004, Carr et al 2003, Decety and 
Chaminade 2003, Baron-Cohen and Wheelright 2004, Lamm, Batson and Decety 2007, de 
Waal 2008, Davidson 2002, Tucker, Luu and Derryberry 2005). Compassion, the emotional 
motivation to be altruistic, is not just about higher morality but the biological evolution of a 
response which 'feels good'. 
As a biological response compassion is not limited to humans. Spontaneous and specific 
altruistic helping, motivated by compassion rather than any instinctive behaviour, is 
recorded in dolphins, elephants and higher primates (Connor and Norris 1982, Caldwell and 
Caldwell 1996, Suzuki and Akiyama 2007, Trivers 1971 Lehmann and Keller 2006, Tomasello, 
Call and Hare 2003, Warneken 2007). Compassionate responses appear to be particularly 
important in higher primates where successful relationships are a key feature in 
evolutionary advantage both individually and as a group (Connor and Norris 1982, Caldwell 
and Caldwell 1996, Suzuki and Akiyama 2007,Trivers 1971 Lehmann and Keller 2006, 
Tomasello, Call and Hare 2003, Warneken 2007). ŚŝŵƉĂŶǌĞĞƐƌŽƵƚŝŶĞůǇ ‘ŚƵŐ ?ƚŚĞůŽƐĞƌŽĨĂ
fight (deWaal 2008, DeWaal and Aureli 1996), figure 1,  and orang-utans might move aside 
ůĞĂǀĞƐƚŽůĞƚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƉĂƐƐďǇŵŽƌĞĞĂƐŝůǇ ?ĚĞtĂĂů ?  ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?ĐƚƐŽĨ ‘ƐĞůĨůĞƐƐĐŽƵƌĂŐĞ ?ŚĂǀĞ
also been recorded in chimpanzees, such as the case of an adult chimpanzee that died 
rescuing a drowning infant from the moat around a zoo enclosure (Goodall 1990: 213; 
deWaal 2008: 289).  
 
 
 
Figure 1. A juvenile chimp puts an arm around a screaming adult male who has just been 
defeated in a fight. After De Waal 2008: figure 1. Photograph by Frans de Waal. 
 
Though it might at first seem counter to the principles of the 'selfish gene', the evolutionary 
context in which compassionate motivations evolve is well understood. In certain 
particularly social animals the payoffs for collaboration which mutual reciprocal altruism 
generate are so great that an emotional motivation to help others is socially advantageous. 
tŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ƚŽ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ŵŝŶĚƐ ƐŽ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ĐŚĞĂƚƐ ? ŽŶ
collaboration can be identified and punished, strong altruistic motivations can evolve which 
go well beyond kin and in situations where there can be no hope of payoff (Sachs et al 2004, 
Trivers 1971, Bowles 2006, Boyd, Bowles, and Richersen, 2003, Boyd and Richersen 1992, 
Aviles 1992, Gintis 2000, Gintis et al 2003, Hill 2002, Fehr and Fischbacher 2003, Fowler 
2005, Lehmann and Keller 2006).  
Compared with our own species, compassion in non-human species is typically fleeting  - 
chimpanzees never make allowances for individuals who are slow or who cannot keep up 
with the groƵƉ ?ŶŽƌĚŽƚŚĞǇ  ‘ƚŚŝŶŬ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ?ŚŽǁƚŽŚĞůƉŽƚŚĞƌƐŝŶ ƚŚĞ ůŽŶŐƚĞƌŵ  ?^ŝůŬĞƚĂů
2005, Jensen et al 2006). Human compassion seems to be qualitatively and quantitatively 
different from that in other species and though the existence of compassion cannot be taken 
and a symbol of 'humanity' its construction and expression are indeed unique. Collaboration 
is likely to have been particularly critical to early human success in open savanna 
environments where predators were common. Furthermore a particular factor stimulating 
the development of such broad ranging emotional investments in our own species appears 
ƚŽŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƚŚĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐŽĨ ‘ĐŽ-ďƌĞĞĚŝŶŐ ?ĂƐŚƵŵĂŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂŶĚŵĂƚƵƌĂƚŝŽŶďĞĐĂŵĞ
increasingly delayed (Kaplan et al 2000, Hrdy 2009, Hublin 2009). Grandmothers, males, 
siblings or others compassionately motivated to help care for dependant offspring would 
make an important contribution to their survival and wellbeing (O'Connell 1999, Panter-
Brick 2002, Aiello and Key 2002). The selective benefits of a predisposition to 'care' for 
others are relatively clear.   
As a result of widespread investments in the wellbeing of others, compassion in our own 
species is far more integral to how all of society works than in other species. Compassion is 
fundamental to human social life and Baron-ŽŚĞŶ ĂŶĚ tŚĞĞůǁƌŝŐŚƚ ĐĂůů ŝƚ  ‘ƚŚĞ ŐůƵĞ ƚŚĂƚ
ŚŽůĚƐ ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ?  ? ? ? ? ? P163). Indeed compassionate responses and reciprocal 
altruisim forms the basis of all close human social relationships (Buchan, Croson and Dawes 
2002, Mikulincer and Shaver 2001, Goleman 2006, Boyd and Richersen 2002, Boyd, Bowles 
and Richersen 2003, Aviles 2002, Sachs et al 2004, Bowles 2006, Evans 2001, Nesse 2001, 
Baron-Cohen and Wheelright 2004, Parkinson, Fischer and Manstead 2005). Through 
empathy (feeling an emotion appropriate to another's emotion) and compassion (being 
motivated to help) we extend ourselves into others (DeWaal 2008). In 'love' we become 
'handcuffed' by our emotional committment to others to act on others' behalves and 
consciously willing to sacrifice our selves by looking after them, taking risks for them or even 
in an extreme giving up our own lives (Frank 2001, Nesse 2001).  
Unlike in other primates, compassionate motivations in humans also extend into the long 
term. Humans show a capĂĐŝƚǇ ƚŽ  ‘ƌĞŐƵůĂƚĞ ? ĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶ ? ƚŽ ďƌŝŶŐ ĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶĂƚĞ
motivations to help others into rational thought and plan ahead for the long term good of 
someone we care for (Gross and Thompson 2006). A reliable sign of compassionate 
motivations has been shown to be a willingness (and planning) to care long term for elderly 
relatives for example (Gillath, Shaver and Mikulincer 2005; Mikulincer and Shaver 2001; 
2005a; Mikulincer et al 2001; 2003; 2005, Soeresen, Webster and Roggman 2002).  
  
Human compassion is also remarkably diverse in comparison to other primates, we can also 
extend caring and commitment way beyond close relationships and kin and towards 
strangers (Mikulincer et al 2001, 2003, Buchan, Croson and Dawes 2002), and not only 
strangers but animals, particularly pets (Odendaal and Meintjes 2003, Nagasawa et al 2009, 
Miller et al 2009) and even abstract concepts (such as 'liberty' or 'justice') and objects 
(Wallendorf and Arnould 1988, Kamptner 1991, Belk 1996, Belk and Coon 1993, Miller 2008, 
Graham 2009) ? /Ŷ Ă ǁĂǇ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ƚŽƚĂůůǇ ƵŶůŝŬĞ ŽƚŚĞƌ ĂŶŝŵĂůƐ ǁĞ ‘ĐĂƌĞ ĨŽƌ ? ? ŵĂŬĞ Ă
commitment to and protect objects as diverse as photographs and gardens, and such objects 
ĐĂŶ ŝŶ ƚƵƌŶ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ  ‘ĐŽŵĨŽƌƚ ?  ?DŝůůĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ? ĞƉƵĞ ĂŶĚ DŽƌƌŽŶĞ-Strupinsky 2005, Graham 
2009).  
   
Though a biologically derived motivation to help others that we 'care' about might seem 
straightforward, the social expression of human compassion is nonetheless remarkably 
complex. Caring for the objects, animals or people to whom we have made a commitment 
can generate conflicts, and our capacity for self sacrifice presents a risk of being exploited. 
Close social ties based on genuine altruism are typically combined with wider social links 
based on 'tit for tat' relationships (Fiske 1991) and in some contexts social relationships are 
even competitive or defensive rather than caring of others (Gilbert 2005; 2009). The capacity 
ĨŽƌĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶ ?ĨĂƌĨƌŽŵďĞŝŶŐĨŽƵŶĚŝŶĂůůƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŝƐĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ‘ƐƋƵĂƐŚĞĚ ?ŝŶƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽ
ŚĂǀĞŐƌŽǁŶƵƉŝŶ ‘ƚŽƵŐŚ ?ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƐ (Gillath, Shaver and Mikulincer 2005; Mikulincer and 
Shaver 2005a; b, Mikulincer et al 2001; 2003; 2005, Gilbert 2002; 2005), potentially as an 
evolutionary mechanism to foster survival in such contexts where compassionate 
motivations might be exploited (Gilbert 2002). Thus certain individuals (up to 30% in modern 
western society, Goleman 2006) are predominantly self-focused in their motivations in close 
personal relationships even though most are predominantly other focused (Mikulincer and 
Shaver 2005b). Those who are more 'self' focused than others are also noticeable in 
ethnographic contexts, such as orphans amongst the Inuit or MButi (Briggs 1970; 1992, 
Turnbull 1965). As well as opportunities for collaborators, those for people who are more 
competitive clearly also exist and certain genetic conditions which emphasise specific talents 
Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƉĞŶƐĞ ŽĨ ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŽ ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ƐƉĞƌŐĞƌ ?Ɛ ^ǇŶĚƌŽŵĞ  ?^ƉŝŬŝŶƐ  ? ? ? ? ) Žƌ
Schizophrenia (Nettle 2006) appear to have been selectively maintained in human 
populations due to their context specific advantages. Clearly a capacity for widespread 
compassion is sometimes overtaken by competitiveness and at times in human society it 
pays to be flexible and to protect oneself rather than to always act on behalf of others.   
  
Compassion in the archaeological record.  
   
How did such a key response develop through prehistory? The archaeological record 
provides us with only the most fragile of glimpses of the behaviour of archaic humans, yet 
within this there are several areas where the evolution of this particularly key emotion might 
be in evidence, of which the clearest is that of care for ill or infirm individuals, sometimes 
over long periods. 
   
Evidence for long term care of others  
 
For some time the concept of compassionate care of others in early species of human was 
largely a contentious one. Finds of early humans who survived disabilities or illnesses and 
appear to have been looked after by others prompted early discussions about compassion in 
archaic humans (Walker, Zimmerman and Leakey 1982, Walker and Shipman 1996, Cameron 
and Groves 2004, Lebel et al 2002). However such ideas were initially met by some 
negativity and an unwillingness to accord archaic humans with motivations which were seen 
as uniquely human. IƚǁĂƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚǁĞŵŝŐŚƚďĞŝŵƉůǇŝŶŐŽƵƌŽǁŶ ‘ŵŽƌĂůƌŝŐŚƚŶĞƐƐ ?ŽŶ
the past (Dettwyler 1991) or misrepresenting the level of disability which might truly 
demand care from others (DeGusta 2002), or failing to appreciate the potential calculated 
 ‘ƐĞůĨŝƐŚ ?ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĐĂƌŝŶŐĨŽƌŽƚŚĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞ ?dĂƌůŽǁ ? ? ? ? ) ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌŽǀĞƌƌĞĐĞŶƚǇĞĂƌƐ ?
as evidence has mounted for both altruism in other great apes (Warneken 2007, DeWaal 
 ? ? ? ? ) ĂŶĚ ǁŝĚĞƐĐĂůĞ ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ĨŽƌ  ‘ĐĂƌĞ ? ŽĨ ŝŶĐĂƉĂĐŝƚ ƚĞĚ ĂƌĐŚĂŝĐ ŚƵŵĂŶƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƐƚ
(Lordkipanidze et al 2005, Shang and Trinkaus 2008, Garcia 2009) the question of whether 
archaic humans showed compassion to others has become much clearer (Hublin 2009). The 
question of the capacity for compassion becomes instead one of how that compassion 
 ‘ǁŽƌŬƐ ? ĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞůǇ ? ǁŚĂƚ ƐƚĂŐĞƐ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŵĂǇ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ
how the emotion is played out in social relationships.  
   
dŚĞ ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ĨŽƌ  ‘ĐĂƌĞ ? ŽĨ ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ŝŶ ĂƌĐŚĂŝĐ ŚƵŵĂŶƐ ŚŽǁƐ Ă ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐ
patterning. The most well known early example of long term support for an incapacitated 
individual comes from KNM-ER 1808, a female Homo ergaster dated to around 1.5 mya 
(Cameron and Groves 2004). Examinations of the skeletal remains of this individual have led 
to suggestions that she was suffering from hypervitaminosis A, a disease caused by excessive 
intake of vitamin A. Symptoms of hypervitaminosis A include a reduction in bone density and 
the development of coarse bone growths, both of which are present in KNM-Z  ? ? ? ? ?Ɛ
skeletal pathology (Walker, Zimmerman and Leakey 1982, Walker and Shipman 1996, 
Cameron and Groves 2004). The pathology present would have taken weeks or even months 
to develop, accompanied by symptoms such as abdominal pain, nausea, headaches, 
dizziness, blurred vision, lethargy, loss of muscular coordination and impaired 
ĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ?^ǇŵƉƚŽŵƐŽĨƚŚŝƐƚǇƉĞǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞŐƌĞĂƚůǇŚŝŶĚĞƌĞĚƚŚŝƐŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐĐapacity 
for independent survival, yet she survived long enough for the disease to be identifiable in 
her skeletal pathology, something which only occurs in the advanced stages of 
hypervitaminosis (figure 2).  ?tĂůŬĞƌĂŶĚ^ŚŝƉŵĂŶƐƵŐŐĞƐƚ “ƐŽŵĞŽŶĞĞůƐĞƚŽŽŬ ĐĂƌĞŽĨŚĞƌ ?
(1996: 134), and Cameron and Groves note:                                                                                  
 “dŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽǁĂǇƐŚĞĐŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƐƵƌǀŝǀĞĚĂůŽŶĞĨŽƌůŽŶŐŝŶƚŚĞĨƌŝĐĂŶƐĂǀĂŶŶĂŚ ?ƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ
must have been feeding her, proƚĞĐƚŝŶŐŚĞƌ ĨƌŽŵĐĂƌŶŝǀŽƌĞƐ ?dŚĞŐƌŽƵƉĚǇŶĂŵŝĐƐŽĨĞĂƌůǇ
,ŽŵŽŵƵƐƚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶďĂƐĞĚŽŶƐŽŵĞĨŽƌŵŽĨŵƵƚƵĂůƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?    
 
Figure 2:  An outer abnormal layer of bone growth on the femoral bone of ER1808 attested to 
the considerable time, possibly months, suffering the severe pain of hypervitaminosis 
 
A capacity for compassionate support by providing food for several weeks in early hominins 
extends beyond the rather fleeting compassion in other higher primates, and is confirmed by 
similar evidence elsewhere.  
An even earlier example of long term care comes from Dmanisi in Georgia, 1.77 million years 
ago (Lordkipanidze et al 2005), figure 3. One of the Dmanisi hominins had lost all but one 
tooth several years before death, with all the sockets except for the canine teeth having 
been re-absorbed. This individual could only have consumed soft plant or animal foods, 
necessitating support from others.  Indeed, in reviewing all the documented lesions and non 
trivial pathologies in Lower and Middle Palaeolithic hominin specimens, a sample of more 
than twenty, Shang and Trinkaus (2008: 435) remark on at least some degree of survival 
from severe injuries in all cases.   
 
 
  
)LJXUHµ7RRWKOHVV¶FUDQLDIURP'PDQLVLFPLOOLRQ\HDUVROG 
 
At a later date, the most in-depth evidence we have for the social behaviour of any archaic 
species, that from the Neanderthals, illustrates a particularly convincing case for widespread 
ĐĂƌĞ ĨŽƌ ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ^ŚĂŶŝĚĂƌ  ? ? ƚŚĞ  ‘KůĚ DĂŶ ŽĨ ^ŚĂŶŝĚĂƌ ? ? ŝƐ ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ ŽŶĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ďĞƐƚ ŬŶŽǁŶ
examples. This individual suffered multiple fractures across his body, with the right side 
being particularly badly affected; the right arm hĂƐďĞĞŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇ “ǁŝƚŚĞƌĞĚ ?
(Klein 1999: 333), highlighting the severity of the injury. The individual also received a 
 ‘ĐƌƵƐŚŝŶŐ ? ŝŶũƵƌǇ ƚŽ ŚŝƐ ĐƌĂŶŝƵŵ ? ƉŽƐƐŝďůǇ ĐĂƵƐŝŶŐďůŝŶĚŶĞƐƐ ŝŶ ŚŝƐ ůĞĨƚ ĞǇĞ ĚƵĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
deformity of the skull (Solecki 1972), and some have even hypothesised that there may have 
ďĞĞŶ ƐŽŵĞ ďƌĂŝŶ ĚĂŵĂŐĞ ĂƐ Ă ƌĞƐƵůƚ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ŝŶũƵƌǇ  ?<ůĞŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ) ? ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ ŽĨ ^ŚĂŶŝĚĂƌ  ? ?Ɛ
injuries have suggested that the majority occurred in adolescence (Trinkaus and Zimmerman 
1982), yet were largely healed, with little sign of infection, by the time of his death, some 
20-35 years later, at the relatively advanced Neanderthal age of between 35-50 years old 
(Trinkaus and Zimmerman 1982).  This individual was not only looked after in the long term, 
but we might assume, given his great longevity in Neanderthal terms, by several different 
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐŝĨŶŽƚĂƐĂƐŚĂƌĞĚŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ ‘ĐĂƌĞ ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞŐƌŽƵƉ ? 
New evidence from Sima de los Huesos suggests that long term care such as that seen for 
Shanidar 1 was not limited to those individuals old enough to have already made a 
contribution to a society. Garcia et al. (2009) document evidence from Cranium 14, an 
individual mostly likely aged between 5 and 8 years old at death, who suffered from 
lambdoid single suture craniosynostosis (SSC), a premature closing of some or all of the 
sutures of the skull. This would have caused an increase in intracranial pressure in the 
Cranium 14 individual, which would have impacted upon the brain growth and cognitive 
ability of the individual, as well as their facial appearance. However, despite this, the 
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ƐƵƌǀŝǀĞĚ ĨŽƌ Ăƚ ůĞĂƐƚ  ? ǇĞĂƌƐ ? ƉƌŽŵƉƚŝŶŐ 'ĂƌĐŝĂ Ğƚ Ăů ? ƚŽ ŶŽƚĞ ƚŚĂƚ  “ŚĞƌ ?ŚŝƐ
pathological condition was not an impediment to receive the same attention as any other 
Middle Pleistocene Homo ĐŚŝůĚ ?(Garcia 2009: 6577), a contrast to behaviour sometimes 
seen in modern humans societies whereby infants with congenital deformities were 
abandoned rather than be cared for by their social groups, such as in the cemetery of  the 
Medieval Hospital of St. James and St. Mary Magdalene in Chichester, which also acted as an 
almshouse from AD 1450 and which saw a high level of infants with craniosynostosis buried 
there, suggesting their abandonment by their families (Storm 2007). It seems that neither 
age nor the type of affliction, whether it be traumatic or congenital, recoverable or life-long, 
detracted from the care given by these archaic humans.  
   
Many other Neanderthal individuals also show evidence for long term care, dating back as 
early as 190-160kbp (Lebel et al 2001). Indeed, research into the population distribution of 
evidence for care of the ill or wounded in Neanderthals supports the notion of widespread 
long term care (table 1). In research from a sample of 19 individuals, representing the 
majority of Neanderthal remains recovered to date, with some 23 different traumatic 
injuries, there was some level of healing to the injuries of 11 of these individuals, 
representing 60% of the total (Rutherford 2007).  Partial healing was also present in 2 of the 
individuals, suggesting that the healing process had at least enough time to begin. It is also 
interesting to note the low rate of infection which seems to be present in the sample of 
Neanderthal trauma, the severity of many of the injuries and their long (approximate) 
healing times. There is only evidence of infection in 2 individuals from the sample of 19 (only 
 ? ?A? ) ? ĂŶĚ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĐĂƐĞƐ ? ŽŶůǇ ^ŚĂŶŝĚĂƌ  ? ?Ɛ ƉĂƚƚĞƌŶ ŽĨ ŝŶĨĞĐƚŝŽŶ ƐĞĞŵƐ ƚŽ ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞ
secondary infection due to trauma (Trinkaus and Zimmerman 1982) and this was largely 
healed at death. The second case, La Ferrassie 1, is not what would be expected if caused by 
a post-traumatic reaction; instead it has been suggested that the infection pattern present is 
more likely due to a systemic skeletal disorder (Fennell and Trinkaus 1997). That the low rate 
of infection occurs in parallel with the high incidence of healing seems to further support 
interpretations of care-giving. The approximate healing times for the injuries within the 
sample are also informative. While these are very much approximations, based upon 
modern medical advice, they still provide another avenue of evidence to suggest care-giving 
in Neanderthals; the fact that the minimum healing time for any injury in the sample is 4-6 
weeks suggests quite a prolonged period when an individual would have needed care and 
support. These injuries were therefore anything but short-term incidences; even after an 
individual trauma had healed, it would not be unreasonable to suggest, as in modern 
examples, that an individual would have reduced capabilities in many areas of life and would 
still require support for possibly much longer after this .    
Early Upper Palaeolithic modern humans also illustrate evidence for cases of extensive care 
of injured or incapacitated individuals. Romito II, a child from the Late Upper Palaeolithic in 
Italy, for example showed severe disability of acromesomelic dysplasia and according to the 
excavators must have been cared for by the whole group until his death at around 17 years 
of age (Manchester 1987). Certain individuals including children with physical abnormalities 
ĚĞŵĂŶĚŝŶŐ ƐŽŵĞ  ‘ĐĂƌĞ ? ĂƉƉĞĂƌ ƚŽhave even been accorded particular attention and 
elaborate grave goods, such as at Sunghir (a mid-Upper Palaeolithic child with bowed long 
bones) (Formicola 2007, Formicola and Buzhilova 2003), and Dolni Vestonice (a probable 
female with shortening of the limbs probably caused by chondrodysplasia calcificans 
punctata (CCP) complicated by trauma and early fractures of the upper limbs) (Alt et al 1997, 
Formicola 2007, Formicola et al 2001).  There are also cases of newborns being buried 
suggesting care was extended to those who had not made an active contribution to the 
group (Einwogerer et al 2006).  
The evidence for compassionate motivations in other areas of the 
archaeological record  
   
Risk taking in collaborative hunting 
Compassionately helping others is of course not limited to caring for those who are ill. 
Another reliable sign of compassionate motivations is a willingness to take risks or suffer 
ƉĂŝŶŽŶĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐďĞŚĂůĨ ?DŝŬƵůŝŶĐĞƌĂŶĚ^ŚĂǀĞƌ ? ? ? ?Ă DŝŬƵůŝŶĐĞƌ ? ? ? ? ) ?ǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĨŽƌƐƵĐŚ
risk taking in archaic humans also supports the picture of a progressive expansion of an 
emotional investment in others integrated with a rational ability to plan ahead through early 
prehistory. Competing with predators for carcasses and at a later date hunting large 
mammals would have been very risky for soft bodied archaic humans (Hart 2005), yet highly 
successful as a strategy if all were prepared to take risks and to protect each other rather 
than individualistically avoiding danger (Spikins 2008). Larger body sizes and slower 
maturation rates at the time of Homo erectus (around 1.8 million bp) have been suggested 
to be the result of successful collaborative scavenging for meat and provisioning of pregnant 
females and young, forming a prime mover for widely shared 'care' of infants (Plummer 
2004). Such collaborative, planned risk taking shows that archaic humans not only took risks 
on behalf of the group, but were able to trust others to do so equally.  
 
By around 500,000 years ago the collaborative hunting of large animals at Boxgrove (Roberts 
and Parfitt 1998) shows an even greater element of conscious risk taking. Puncture wounds 
on a horse scapula at site GTP17 at this site have been interpreted to suggest the use of 
projectile weapons, and carcass butchery techniques illustrate very early access to carcasses 
i.e. that at this time, Homo heidelbergensis were either actively hunting large mammals or 
actively competing with large carnivores for carcasses.  Whether actively hunting or 
competing with large carnivores any individual, sorely unsuited to defence from predators or 
from large mammals, might place themselves at considerable risk, and given evidence for 
weapons preparation prior to foraging, clearly planned to do so.  
 
By the Middle Palaeolithic, Neanderthals clearly planned ahead as shown from evidence for 
ĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞ ‘ĚƌŝǀĞƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐĂƚ>ĂŽƚƚĞĚĞ^ƚƌĞůĂĚĞŝŶ:ĞƌƐĞǇ ?^ĐŽƚƚ ? ? ? ? )ŽƌĨŽŽĚ ?ĐĂĐŚŝŶŐ ?
(Schild 2006) and humans willingly took substantial risks in collaborative hunting, with 
almost all suffering serious injuries as a consequence (Berger and Trinkaus 1995).  
 
Sharing of grief in mortuary behaviour. 
Further evidence for an extended sense of group, rather than individual identity and concern 
with group wellbeing comes from mortuary behaviour.  The deliberate placing of the bones 
of about thirty individuals into a pit at Sima de los Huesos, Atapuerca, Spain at around 
400kbp (Carbonell and Mosqueara 2006) suggests grief, in its joint expression in shared 
ritual, was shared. Somewhat later, formal burials are recorded for Neanderthals (Riel 
Salvatore and Clark 2001, Petitt 2002), with the earliest at Tabun, in the Near East at 112-
143kbp (Zilhão 2007). Whether or not Neanderthals could conceive of a spiritual being or 
afterlife as Dunbar suggests (Dunbar 2003; 2007), explicit burials shows both sharing of 
emotional states and their regulation through externalizing emotion in the material world. 
More than twenty Neanderthal burials are recorded, although evidence for more explicit 
symbolism in buried grave goods is more contentious (Pettitt 2002). Greenspan and Shanker 
(2004) suggest that such 'regulation' of grief through sharing of the emotion and 
externalising it in the material world shows an emphasis on symbolising and sharing 
emotional states and relates to the increasing role of shared socio-moral emotions in 
ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?^ŚĂƌĞĚ ‘ĐĂƌŝŶŐ ?ĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞďŽĚǇĂƚĚeath may reflect similar motivations to those of 
caring for the living.  
 
The comfort of 'things' 
In much the same way that the body of someone diseased cannot reciprocate emotionally in 
the way that the living may do, yet nonetheless inspires a motivation to care and protect, 
other objects can, from relatively recently in evolutionary history inspire similar feelings. 
Widespread 'caring' for things that become immersed in emotional relationships with people 
only seems to develop remarkably late in evolutionary history. Personal ornaments are 
known amongst Neanderthals (Hublin et al 1996) but it is only with modern humans that 
such objects become widespread and fundamental to society (Mellars 1989; 1990, Klein 
1999, McBrearty and Brooks 2000, Kuhn and Stiner 2007, White 1993; 2007; Mellars 2007). 
'Caring' for objects (and in turn feeling 'cared for' and 'comforted' by objects) appears to be 
essential to modern human society. Though we know that 'gifts' form part of networks of 
obligation (Mauss 1990 (1922)) or display status (Jones 1997), amongst close relationships 
they also form networks of genuine selfless 'giving' to provide comfort for another 
(Wallendorf and Arnould 1988, Testart 1998, Kamptner 1991, Belk 1996, Belk and Coon 
1993, Miller 2008, Graham 2009).  
  
The archaeological evidence for personal ornaments seems particularly associated with 
modern humans. Thus we see early evidence of beads in the Near East in the form of two 
perforated marine shells at Skhul, dated to 100-135kbp (VanhaerĞŶĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƌƌŝĐŽĂŶĚ
Vanhaeren 2007), and the selection of shells with natural perforations at Quafzeh, dated to 
 ? ? ?ŬďƉ  ?DĐƌĞĂƌƚǇ ĂŶĚ ƌŽŽŬƐ  ? ? ? ? ?  ?ƌƌŝĐŽ ĂŶĚ sĂŶŚĂĞƌĞ   ? ? ? ? ) ǁŝƚŚ ďĞĂĚƐ ůĂƚĞƌ
becoming widespread such as in the European aurignaciaŶ  ? ?ƌƌŝĐŽ ĂŶĚ sĂŶŚĂĞƌĞŶ  ? ? ? ? ?
Zilhão 2007). In many cases necklaces or bracelets of marine shells would have been worn 
for considerable periods of time, very possibly for over a year (Henshilwood 2007: 127, 
figure 2). A particularly evocative reminder of a relationship with another is found in the 
form of a human molar from Aurignacian levels at Isturitz which has clearly been suspended 
and much worn (White 2007: 294).  
  
Gamble (2007) and Coward and Gamble (2008) suggests that socially important objects, 
seen as 'part' of people (Strathern 1988, LiPuma 1998) allowed relationships to be 
maintained over long distances. Indeed the transport of non functional marine shells and 
other exotic items up 1500 km (Feblot- Augustins 1993; 1997, Marwick 2003, Gamble 1982; 
1998; 1999: 2003: 321) in Upper Palaeolithic Europe certainly illustrates that things 
 ‘ŵĂƚƚĞƌĞĚ ? ƚŽ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ŝŶ ŚŝŐŚůǇ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ǁĂǇƐ ?  Anthropological interpretations of such 
relationships of objects as part of the 'dividual', conceptually an extended part of the self, 
might usefully be combined with an understanding of the emotional extension of people 
through compassion.  Certainly ethnographic studies support the important emotional role 
of 'precious' objects that form an emotional relationship with people 'as if' they were a 
person, tying in with studies of how objects such as photographs function psychologically 
today in 'standing for' someone who makes us feel comforted and secure (Mikulincer and 
Shaver 2005a,b, Mikulincer et al 2001; 2003; 2005, Depue and Morrone-Strupinsky 2005: 
326). Bar-Yosef Mayer and Porat (2008) detail ethnographic studies showing that in 
widespread contexts personal ornaments help people feel more open and confident as 
they   ‘ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŽƌĚŝǀĞƌƚƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚƐŽĨƐƵƉĞƌŶĂƚƵƌĂůƉŽǁĞƌƐĂŶĚ ? ? ?ďƌŝŶŐůƵĐŬĂŶĚƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚ ?
(after Morris and Preston-Whyte 1994: 55) and other studies also illustrate the importance 
of an attachment, and willingness to care for objects that 'stand for' people or important 
social memories in small scale societies.  
  
'small wonder that the attainment of these most coveted shells, encrusted as they are with 
histories of people's successes, fills a person with emotional feeling for the shell itself' Weiner 
1992, 144.  
   
'Bambi Schieffelin tells of how the egalitarian Kaluli deeply treasure bits of cloth or tiny 
pieces of shell that once belonged to a deceased kin, carrying it with them wherever they go. 
The Trobrianders enlarge upon these feelings, ritually carrying a dead person's hair or 
fingernails that have been inserted into shell necklaces' Weiner 1992, 130.  
    
Extending our capacity to 'care' for objects appears to also be related cognitively to 
extensions to other intangible areas such as to capacities to care about and make a 
committment to abstract concepts (such as 'freedom of speech', 'liberty' or 'justice'). Dunbar 
illustrates that prefrontal cortex size suggests that the theory of mind abilities (ToM) 
reached a capacity to conceive of an abstract concept, such as a god or spirits, at 200-
100,000 years ago, tying in with evidence for 'caring' for commonly recognised symbolic 
ŽďũĞĐƚƐ ? /ŶĚĞĞĚ ŶŽƚ ŽŶůǇ ŽďũĞĐƚƐ ďƵƚ ĂŶǇ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ǁŚŝĐŚ  ‘ŵĞĂŶƐ ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ? ƚŽ Ă ŐƌŽƵƉ ŽĨ
ƉĞŽƉůĞĐĂŶĂůƐŽďĞ ‘ĐĂƌĞĚĂďŽƵƚ ?ĂŶĚŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚƐŵĂĚĞŝŶŝƚƐƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?Žƌrisks taken for 
its defence. Many have chosen to 'die for one's country' showing an emotional committment 
to sacrifice for concepts which goes way beyond self interest or simply complying with social 
norms. Such a widespread willingness to act against one's own self-interest for the apparent 
good of the 'group' can of course easily be exploited and Evans (2001) illustrates that 
committment to the wellbeing of others, 'love', is also the basis for long-standing feuds and 
vendettas where each is prepared to risk death to 'protect' their group.   
 
From a simple motivation to provide food for an incapacitated individual in early humans, 
compassion became a reason for living, or for dying, and a structural fundamental to human 
social life.  
 
A model for the development of human compassion 
 
A brief review of the archaeological evidence for emotional investments in the wellbeing of 
others allows us to propose four key levels of a capacity for compassion (figure 4, figure 5).  
  
Level One: At approximately 6 - 1.8 million years ago we might expect to see compassion in 
archaic humans as a fleeting response to another's distress. In common with other higher 
primates the common ancestor between humans and chimpanzees (at about 6 million years 
ago) for example would have ďĞĞŶ ůŝŬĞůǇ ƚŽ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ĂďůĞ ƚŽ ĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞ ŽĨ ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛ
ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĞŵƉĂƚŚŝƐĞǁŝƚŚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐĨĞĞůŝŶŐƐĂŶĚďĞŵŽƚŝǀĂƚĞĚƚŽŚĞůƉƚŚĞŵ ?ĚĞtĂĂů ? ? ? ? ) ?
dŚŝƐ  ‘ŚĞůƉŝŶŐ ?ŵŝŐŚƚŚĂǀĞƚĂŬĞŶƚŚĞ ĨŽƌŵŽĨĂŶ ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞŐĞƐƚƵƌĞŽĨĐŽŵĨŽƌƚ  ?ĞŐ  ‘ŚƵŐ ? )ƚŽ
one in distress, or ĂǀĞƌǇůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ‘ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ?ŽĨĂŶŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵƐƵĐŚĂƐŵŽǀŝŶŐ
ŽďƐƚĂĐůĞƐ ŝŶ ĂŶ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐƉĂƚŚ ? By the time of species such as Homo habilis (2.3-1.6 mill 
years) or rudolfensis (1.9 mill years) transport of carcasses is likely to have been a group 
activity (Rose 2001, Plummer 2004) as well as collaborative defence against predators (Hart 
2005). Though it is difficult to judge we might assume that a propensity towards 
collaboration in food procurement and defence begins to be crucially important as hominins 
survive in relatively open savanna environments.    
   
Level Two: Emerging from 1.8 million years compassion begins to be 'regulated' as an 
emotion which is integrated with rational thought. Within Homo erectus (1.9-1.6 mill years), 
and later Homo heidelbergensis in europe the acquisition of meaty carcasses and body size 
energetics suggests that meat was shared extensively, with pregnant females and those with 
young infants likely to have been provisioned with food (Plummer 2004). 'Helpers' with the 
care of offspring, whether these be males (Panter-Bruck 2002), siblings or grandmothers 
(O'Connell et al 1999) may have played an important role in evolutionary success (Aiello and 
Key 2002). Compassion thus gradually became extended widely into non-kin and in 
potentially extensive investments in caring for offspring and equally for ill individuals. Those 
who were incapacitated might be provisioned with food for at least several weeks if not 
longer. By around 400,000 bp with the emergence of mortuary treatment such compassion, 
and grief at the loss of someone cared for, emotions which bind us to others might be able 
to be symbolised in communication and recognisable as something akin to 'love'. One might 
speculate that other social emotions such as shame began to also structure archaic human 
social relationships within such collaborative contexts.   
   
Level Three: (300,000-50,000 in Europe) By the time of the Neanderthals in Europe, the 
regulation of compassion extends into deep seated committments to the welfare of others. 
With a long period of adolescence and a dependance on collaborative hunting, Neanderthals 
society depended on deep seated emotional investments beyond the self. Theory of mind 
abilities allowing understanding of the shared beliefs of several individuals (Dunbar 2007) 
and long term planning capacities (Schild 2006) appear to have supported routine care of 
the injured or infirm over extended periods. Much of the sustained care such as of the 
Shanidar Neanderthal must have involved not a single individual but at least several over his 
lifespan if not the whole group, and in these cases suggests a shared emotional motivation 
ƚŽ ŚĞůƉ ? ƐŚĂƌĞĚ  ‘ƐŽĐŝŽ-ŵŽƌĂů ? ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶƐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚ ƚŚĂƚother such emotions, 
remorse, shame, empathy were also in evidence. Such emotional committment to others 
may have made abandonment of the disabled Neanderthal child at Atapuerca (Gracia 2009) 
'unthinkable' for them, even though such children were abandoned in Medieval Europe. 
Indeed the healing rates in Neanderthals exceed evidence for care in historically recorded 
cemeteries (Rutherford 2007). Neanderthal language, judging by their sharing of the FOXP2 
gene associated with language development, was at least complex enough to deal with 
communication of emotions (Mithen 2006, Trinkaus 2007).  Though 'compassionate', 
Neanderthal society appears to have been very different from that of modern humans, with 
for example little contact between groups or with strangers as illustrated by their limited 
mobility (Féblot-Augustins 1993: 214). Neanderthals seem to have been no strangers to 
'love' but it may not have been as we would know it.   
 Level Four: Within Modern humans (from 120,000 in Africa, 40,000 in Europe) the capacity 
for compassion extends into strangers, animals, objects and abstract concepts, and becomes 
flexible to context. These developments, shown as a 'branch' in the model, are perhaps best 
seen as a difference in the expression of compassion, rather than a progressive extension. 
KďũĞĐƚƐďĞĐŽŵĞ ‘ĐĂƌĞĚĨŽƌ ? ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇĂƐƐǇŵďŽůƐ ĨƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝǀĞŚƵŵĂŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐĂŶĚŝŶ
turn can provide comfort. Abstract concepts, illustrated by the emergence of symbolic art, 
ĐĂŶ ĂůƐŽ ďĞ  ‘ĐĂƌĞĚ ĂďŽƵƚ ? ĂŶĚ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚĞĚ Žƌsacrificed for. Widespread connections across 
large areas, as shown by the movement of marine shells, show an ability to relate to 
ƐƚƌĂŶŐĞƌƐŝŶĂŶŽƉĞŶĂŶĚƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ ‘ĐĂƌŝŶŐ ?ǁĂǇĂŶĚĚĞǀĞůŽƉƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚƌƵƐƚŝŶ
non exploitative motivations. However in the new hurly-burly of widespread social 
connections, the complex range of different social contexts may also have provided the 
contexts and pressures for different and less compassionate minds to emerge to take on 
different roles.  
 
Figure 4. Stages in the development of human 
compassion
 
 
Stage One: Fleeting compassionate care for others 
x Fleeting compassion ± H[WHQVLRQLQWRRWKHU¶VZHOOEHLQJWKURXJK
gestures of comfort, tolerated scrounging 
x No clear archaeological traces 
 
Stage Two: Compassion extended into relatively simple long term care 
x 5HJXODWLRQRIFRPSDVVLRQLQWRFDSDFLW\WRµWKLQNWKURXJK¶WKHORQJ
term wellbeing of others ±  such as provisioning of food and 
FRRUGLQDWLQJIRUDJLQJVRWKDWLQGLYLGXDOVDUHQRWµOHIWEHKLQG¶ 
x Occasional archaeological evidence for injured  individuals who 
have been provided with food over sustained period 
 
Stage Three: Compassion as a structuring 
principle, with close knit groups showing 
widespread altruistic care and risk taking for 
others 
x Compassion regulated into long term 
commitment to others at the expense of 
VHOIZLWKµFDUH¶LQFRUSRUDWHGLQWRORQJ
term planning 
x Archaeological evidence for successful 
collaborative tasks (such as hunting), 
long term care of the ill or incapacitated, 
and risk taking on behalf of others 
 
Stage Four: Compassion integrated into relationships 
with objects and with abstract thought, and becoming 
sensitive to context.  
x The emergence of a capacity for emotional 
investments extended into strangers, objects, 
animals and concepts. 
x $UFKDHRORJLFDOHYLGHQFHIRUµFDUH¶IRU
objects beyond functional needs, for objects 
forming emotional relationships with people, 
and for shared concepts which cross large 
regions 
x The emergence of structured differences in 
emotional construction within different 
spheres 
x Archaeological evidence for specialised 
spheres of activity appropriate to differing 
motivations 
 
The explanation for the emergence of such changes may well lie in the formation of wider 
social networks in early modern humans. Capacities to store and manipulate more extensive 
social memories (Depue and Morrone-Strupinsky 2005) or to develop rule based means of 
communication and collaboration with other groups (Spikins 2009) may have prompted 
extended communication outside close kin and allowed much wider exchange networks 
(Marwick 2003) . Such networks may have have been the impetus for a the widening of 
compassion beyond close human relationships to include objects as means of providing 
security in uncertain social environments and at the same time a flexibility of compassionate 
responses to protect against exploitation. 
 
 
Figure 5: Stages in the development of emotional commitment and collaboration 
 
Whilst is it hoped that a simple model might provide a basis for discussion, several issues still 
remain.  
 
  
One: fleeting 
emotional investments 
in others 
Two: sustained 
investments in others 
and emotionally based 
collaboration  
Three: In depth 
collaboration through 
emotional commitment Four: In depth emotional collaboration with 
some, emotional isolation Žƌ ‘ƚŝƚĨŽƌƚĂƚ ?
collaboration with others, and some long 
distance emotional investments maintained 
through objects 
Further Issues 
 
Compassion and other elements of 'mind' 
Though a need to simplify forces us to focus on one element of cognition, it is perhaps overly 
simplistic to hope to take any one element of 'mind' in isolation. Whilst the archaeological 
record provides some clues as to the progressive role and extent of compassionate 
motivations towards others we know that compassion must also have developed in relation 
to other areas of cognition and within wider social relationships. The immediate motivation 
to help others, fuelled by an oxytocin response, may be straightforward, but caring for 
someone else in the long term, as we see in the archaeological record, is in truth a 
cognitively complex task. One must understand and predict their abilities and  future 
behaviour and equally ensure that one's caring motivations are not exploited by 'cheats'. In 
this context the evolution of compassionate responses must inevitably have been related to 
developments in ToM, and mirror progressive developments in neocortex size (Dunbar 
2003, 2007). Caring for someone long term equally demands the effective regulation of 
compassion to be part of rational thought and such integration of feeling and action would 
also have been influenced by the development of symbolism and the symbolic 
representation of feeling (Greenspan and Shanker 2004, Hobson 2004). Indeed disentangling 
the relationship between 'precious' objects as symbols and as things that are 'cared for' and 
stand in for human relationships is challenging. Most of all, the development of compassion 
must also be affected by elements of the social and cultural context, such as ecological 
influences on group size and a need to defend from predators (Dunbar 2003, 2007) and by 
developments other areas of social emotion (Greenspan and Shanker 2004). The evolution 
of emotional self-punishment for selfish acts, through shame, guilt and loss of self-esteem 
(Gintis 2003), like that of altruistic punishment of cheats (deQuervain et al 2004) relates 
intimately to the context allowing compassion to flourish. Indeed the evolution of the 
involuntary physical expression of such social emotions in crying and blushing (Evans 2001), 
not seen in any other primate, must be intimately related to the development of 
compassionate abilities to forgive and re-integrate any supposed trangressor. The 
development of compassion was both part of changes in other aspects of cognition and 
social relationships and in turn influenced such changes.  
 
Whilst we might never fully appreciate the interpersonal expression of compassion in the 
past, in simple terms a brief review provides us with some building blocks for a speculative 
model of the fundamental elements in the development of human compassion. Such a 
model must inevitably be very simplified, and equally fail to describe the true complex 
branching of what must have been different expressions of compassion in different species 
of archaic human but nonetheless perhaps provide a basis for integrating discussions of the 
capacity for compassion within other debates within the evolution of the human 'mind'.   
  
From homininity to humanity  
   
The first steps in a prehistoric archaeology of compassion must neccessarily be tentative. 
New archaeological evidence for care of archaic humans and for altruism in great apes plus a 
greater understanding of how emotions 'work' cognitively has allowed us to begin to bring 
what were once intangible concepts of the 'feelings' of ancient humans into the area of 
scientific explanation. It becomes feasible to discuss the development of compassion, that 
apparently most 'human' of feelings, in the past and in the process we move from a purely 
scientific and rational construcion of archaic humans into one in which our earliest ancestors 
become far more familiar. Though we approach it scientifically, the development of 
compassion in archaic humans tells us an important and also perhaps a moving story.  We 
have traditionally paid a great deal of attention to how early humans thought about others, 
and how they understood other's beliefs or intentions, but it may well be time to pay rather 
more attention to whether or not they 'cared'.   
   
Acknowledgements 
Thanks are due to all of those who contributed in depth to discussions of our ideas and to earlier 
ĚƌĂĨƚƐŽĨƚŚŝƐƉĂƉĞƌŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐdĞƌƌǇK ?ŽŶŶŽƌ ?^ƚĞǀĞZŽƐŬĂŵƐ ?'ĞŽĨĨĂŝůĞǇ ?:ƵůŝĂŶZŝĐŚĂƌĚƐ ?tĞŶĚǇ
Romer, Wayne Britcliffe and Paul Gilbert. Any errors are our own.  
 
References 
Aiello L. C, Key C. 2002. Energetic consequences of being a Homo erectus female. Am J Hum Biol 
14:551 ?565.  
Alt, K.W., Pichler, S., Vach, W., Klima, B., Vicek, E., Sedimeier, J. 1997. Twenty-five thousand-year-old 
triple burial from Dolní Vestonice: An ice-age family? American Journal of Physical Anthropology 102, 
1, 123-13. 
Aviles, L. 2002. Solving the freeloader paradox: genetic associations and frequency dependant 
selection in the evolution of cooperation among non-relatives. Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences USA 99, 14268-14273. 
Barham, L. S. 1998. Possible early pigment use in south-central Africa. Current Anthropology 39: 73-
710. 
Barham, L. S. 2000. The Middle Stone Age of Zambia, South Central Africa. London: Western Academic 
and Specialist Press. 
Barham, L. S. 2002. Systematic pigment use in the Middle Pleistocene of south central Africa. Current 
Anthropology 31:1. 181-190. 
Baron-Cohen, S and S. Wheelwright. 2004. The Empathy Quotient: An Investigation of Adults with 
Asperger Syndrome or High Functioning Autism, and Normal Sex Differences, Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders 34: 2. 163-175. 
Bar-Yosef Mayer, D. E., and Porat, N. 2008. Green stone beads at the dawn of agriculture, Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences 105, 25, 8548-8551. 
Belk, R. W. and Coon, G. S., 1993. Gift giving as agapic love: an alternative to the exchange paradigm 
based on dating experiences, Journal of Consumer Research vol 20, 393. 
Belk, R.W. 1996. The Perfect Gift, chapter 4 of Gift- Giving: A research anthology. Popular Press.  
Berger, T. B. and E. Trinkaus. 1995. Patterns of Trauma among the Neanderthals. Journal of 
Archaeological Science 22: 6. 841-852. 
Boehm, C. 1993. Egalitarian Behaviour and Reverse Dominance Hierarchy. Current Anthropology 34: 3. 
227-240. 
Boehm, C. 1999. Hierarchy in the Forest. London: Harvard University Press. 
ŽƵǌŽƵŐŐĂƌ ? ? ?ĂƌƚŽŶ ?E ? ?sĂŶŚĂĞƌĞŶ ?D ? ? ?ƌƌŝĐŽ ?& ? ?ŽůůĐƵƚƚ ?^ ? ?,ŝgham, T., Hodge, E., Parfitt, S., 
Rhodes, E., Schwenninger, J-L., Stringer, C., Tuner, E., Ward, S., Moutmir, A. and A. Stambouli. 2007. 
82,000 year old shell beads from North Africa and implications for the origins of modern human 
behaviour. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 104: 24. 9964-9969. 
Bowles, S. 2006. Group competition, reproductive leveling and the evolution of human altruism. 
Science 314. 1569-1572. 
Boyd, R. G. H., Bowles, S., and Richersen, P. J. 2003. The evolution of altruistic punishment. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 100: 3531-3535. 
Boyd, R., and P. J. Richersen. 1992. Punishment allows the evolution of co-operation (or anything else) 
in sizable groups. Ethology and Sociobiology 13. 171-195. 
Briggs, J. 1970. Never in Anger: Portrait of an Eskimo Family. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.   
Briggs, J. 1992. Inuit Morality Play: The emotional education of a three-year-old. New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press.  
Buchan, N. R., Croson, R. T. A. and R. M. Dawes. 2002. Swift Neighbours and persistent strangers: a 
cross-cultural investigation of trust and reciprocity in social exchange. American Journal of Sociology 
108. 168-206. 
Caldwell, M. C., and D. K. Caldwell. 1996. Epimeletic (caregiving) beaviour in Cetecea, in  Whales, 
dolphins and porpoises, ed. K. S. Norris, 755-89. Berkeley: University of California press.  
Cameron, D. W., and C. P. Groves. 2004. Bones, Stones and Molecules. California and London: Elsevier.  
Carbonell E., and M. Mosqueara. 2006, The emergence of symbolic behaviour: The sepulchral pit of 
Sima de los Huesos, Sierra de Atapuerca, Burgos, Spain. Comptes Rendus-Palevol 5: 1-2. 155-160. 
Carr, L., Iacoboni, M., Dubeau, M-C., Mazzita, J. C., and G. L. Lenzi. 2003. Neural mechanisms of 
empathy in humans: A relay from neural systems for imitation to limbic areas. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences 100: 9. 5497-502. 
Connor, R. C., and K. S. Norris. 1982. Are dolphins and whales reciprocal altruists? American Naturalist 
119. 358-374. 
Coward, F.,and Gamble, C. 2008. Big brains, small worlds: material culture and the evolution of the 
mind, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B. 363, 1969-1979. 
 ?ƌƌŝĐŽ ?& ?ĂŶĚD ?sĂŶŚĂĞƌĞŶ ? 2007. Evolution or Revolution?: New evidence for the origin of 
symbolic behaviour in and out of Africa, in Re-thinking the human revolution, eds. P. Mellars, K. Boyle, 
O. Bar-Yosef and C. Stringer. 275-85. Cambridge: McDonald Institute Monographs.  
 ?ƌƌŝco, F., Henshilwood, C., Lawson, G., Vanhaeren, M., Tillier, A.-M., Soressi, M., Bresson, F., 
Maureille, B., Nowell, A., Lakarra, J., Backwell, L and M. Julien. 2003. Archaeological evidence for the 
emergence of language, symbolism and music  W an alternative multidisciplinary perspective. Journal 
of World Prehistory 17: 1. 1-70. 
Damasio, A. 2000. The Feeling of What Happens: Body, emotion and the making of consciousness. 
London: Vintage.  
Davidson, R. 2002. Towards a biology of positive affect and compassion, in Visions of Compassion: 
Western Scientists and Tibetan Buddhists Examine Human Nature, eds. R. Davidson and A. Harrison. 
107-130. New York: Oxford University Press. 
De Quervain, J-F., Fischbacher, U., Treyer, V., Schellhammer, M., Schnyder, U., Buck, A., and Fehr, E. 
2004. The neural basis of altruistic punishment, Science 305, 1254-1257.  
De Waal, F. B. M and F. Aureli. 1996. Consolation, reconciliation, and a possible cognitive different 
between macaque and chimpanzee. In Reaching into Thought: The Minds of the Great Apes, eds. A. E. 
Russon, K. A. Bard, and S. T. Parker. 80-110. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
De Waal, F. B. M. 2008. Putting the Altruism back into altruism: The evolution of empathy. Annual 
Review of Psychology 59. 279-300. 
Decety, J., and Chaminade. T. 2003. Neural correlates of feeling sympathy. Neuropsychologia 41. 127-
38. 
DeGusta D (2002) Comparative skeletal pathology and the case for conspecific care in Middle 
Pleistocene hominins. Journal Archaeological Science 29:1435 W1438. 
Depue, R. A. and Morrone-Strupinsky, J. V. 2005. A neurobiological model of affiliative bonding: 
Implications for conceptualizing a human trait of affiliation, Behavioural and Brain Sciences 28, 313-
395 
Dettwyler, K. A. 1991. Can paleopathology provide evidence for compassion? American Journal of 
Physical Anthropology 84, 4, 375-384. 
Doi, T. 1973. The anatomy of independance. Tokyo: Kodansha International.  
Dunbar, R. I. M. and Schultz, S. 2007. Evolution in the Social Brain, Science 317: 1344-1347 
Dunbar, R. I.M., 2003. The Social brain: mind, language and society in an evolutionary perspective. 
Annual Review of Anthropology 32. 163-181. 
Dunbar, R. I.M., 2007. The Social Brain and the cultural explosion of the human revolution, in Re-
thinking the human revolution, eds. P. Mellars, K. Boyle, O. Bar-Yosef and C. Stringer. 91-98. 
Cambridge: McDonald Institute Monographs. 
Eder, A. B., Hommel, B and Houwer, J. D. 2007. How different is affective processing? A special Issue 
of Cognition and Emotion. Psychology Press.  
Ekman, P. 1992. An argument for basic emotions. Cognition and Emotion 6, 169-200.  
Ekman, P. and Friesen, W. V. 1971. Constants across cultures in the face and emotion. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 17, 124-129. 
Einwögerer, T., Friesinger, H., Händel, M., Neugebauer-Maresch, C., Simon, U., Teschler-Nicola, M. 
2006. Upper Palaeolithic Infant Burials, Nature 444, 285. 
Erdal, D and A. Whiten. 1996. Egalitarianism and Machiavellian intelligence in human evolution. In 
Modelling the Early Human Mind, eds. P. Mellars and K. Gibson, 139 W150. Cambridge: MacDonald 
Institute for Archaeology. 
Evans, D. 2001. Emotion: The Science of Sentiment. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Feblot-Augustins, J. 1993. Mobility Strategies in the Late Middle Palaeolithic of Central Europe and 
Western Europe: Elements of Stability and Variability, Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 12. 211-
265. 
Feblot-Augustins, J., 1997. La Circulation des Matières Premières au Paléolithique. (Etudes et 
ZĞĐŚĞƌĐŚĞƐƌĐŚĂĞŽůŽŐŝƋƵĞƐĚĞů ?hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚĞĚĞ>ŝğŐĞ ? ? ? Liège: University de Liège. 
Fehr, E., and U. Fischbacher. 2003. The nature of human altruism. Nature 425. 137-140. 
Fennell, K. J. and E. Trinkaus. 1997. Bilateral and tibial periostitis in the La Ferrassie 1 Neanderthal. 
Journal of Archaeological Science 24: 11. 985-995. 
Fiske, A. P. 1991. Structures of Social Life: The Four Elementary Forms of Human Relations, New York: 
Maxwell Macmillan International. 
Fiske, A. P. 2002. Socio-moral emotions motivate action to sustain relationships. Self and Identity 1 
(2), 169-175. 
Formicola V, Pontrandolfi, A, and Svoboda J. 2001. The Upper Paleolithic triple burial of 
ŽůŶŦǲsĞǼƐƚŽŶŝĐĞ PƉĂƚŚŽůŽŐǇĂŶĚĨƵŶĞƌĂƌǇďĞŚĂǀŝŽƌ ?American Journal of Physical Anthropology 
115:372 W379. 
Formicola, V., and Buzhilova, A. P. 2003. Double child burial from sunghir (Russia): Pathology and 
inferences for upper paleolithic funerary practices, American Journal of Physical Anthropology 124, 3, 
189-198 
Formicola, V. 2007. From the Sunghir Children to the Romito Dwarf. Current Anthropology 48, 3. 446-
452. 
Fowler, C. 2004. The Archaeology of Personhood: An anthropological approach. Routledge.  
Fowler, J., 2005. Altruistic punishment and the origin of cooperation, Proceeedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 102, 19, 7047-7049. 
Frank, R. H. 1988. Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions. New York: W. W. 
Norton and Co. 
Frank, R. H. 2001. Cooperation through Emotional Commitment, in Evolution and the Capacity for 
Commitment, ed. R. Nesse, 57-76. New York: Russell Sage Foundation Series on Trust.  
Gamble, C. 1982. Interaction and Alliance in Palaeolithic Society, Man New Series 17: 1. 92-107. 
Gamble, C. 1998. Palaeolithic society and the release from proximity: A network approach to intimate 
social relationships. World Archaeology 29: 3. 426-449. 
Gamble, C. 1999. The Palaeolithic Societies of Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Gamble, C. 2007. Origins and Revolutions: Human Identity in Earliest Prehistory. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.   
Garcia A, et al. 2009. Craniosynostosis in the Middle Pleistocene human Cranium 14 from the Sima de 
los Huesos, Atapuerca, Spain. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 106:6573 W6578. 
Gilbert, P. 2002. Evolutionary approaches to psychopathology and cognitive therapy. Journal of 
Cognitive Psychotherapy 16: 3. 263-329. 
Gilbert, P. 2005. Compassion and Cruelty, in Compassion: Conceptualisations, Research and Use in 
Psychotherapy, ed. P. Gilbert. 9-74. London and New York: Routledge. 
Gilbert, P. 2009. The Compassionate Mind, London: Constable 
Gillath, O., Shaver, P. R., and M. Mikulincer. 2005. An attachment-theoretical approach to compassion 
and altruism, in Compassion: Conceptualisations, Research and Use in Psychotherapy, ed. P. Gilbert. 
121-47. London and New York: Routledge. 
Gillath, O., Shaver, P. R., Mikulincer, M, Nitzberg, R., Erez, A., Van Ijzendoorn, M. H., 2005. 
Attachment, caregiving and volunteering: placing volunteerism in an attachment-theoretical 
framework, Personal Relationships 12 (4) 425-446 
Gintis, H. 2000. Strong reciprocity and human sociality. Journal of Theoretical Biology 206. 169-179. 
Gintis, H. 2003. The Hitchhiker's Guide to Altruism: Gene-culture coevolution, and the internalisation 
of norms. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 220, 407-418 
Gintis, H., Bowles, S., Boyd, R and E. Fehr. 2003. Explaining altruistic behaviour in humans. Evolution 
and Human Behaviour  24. 153-172. 
Goleman, D. 2006. Social Intelligence. New York: Hutchinson. 
Goodall, J. 1990. Through a window: My thirty years with the chimpanzees of Gombe, Boston, MA: 
Houghton Mifflin.  
Graham, D. B. P. 2009. The three-year old and his attachment to a special soft object, Journal of Child 
Psychology and Psychiastry 20, 3, 217-224 
Greenspan, S. I. and S. G. Shanker. 2004. The first idea: how symbols, language, and intelligence 
evolved from our primate ancestors to modern humans. Cambridge: Da Capo Press (Perseus Books 
Group). 
Gross, J. J. and R. A. Thompson. 2006. Emotion Regulation: Conceptual Frameworks, in J. J. Gross. 
Handbook of Emotion Regulation. 3-26. London: Guildford Press.  
Hart, D., 2005 Man the hunted, Westview Press.  
Hee Kim, S.,  and S. Hamann. 2007. Neural Correlates of Positive and Negative Emotion Regulation. 
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 19:5. 776-798. 
Heinrich, J and F.J. Gil-White. 2001. The evolution of prestige. Freely conferred deference as a 
mechanism for enhancing the benefits of cultural transmission. Evolution and Human Behaviour 22. 
165 W96. 
,ĞŶƐŚŝůǁŽŽĚ ? ? ? ?ƌƌŝĐŽ ?& ? ?sĂŶŚĂĞƌĞŶ ?D ? ?sĂŶEŝĞŬĞƌŬ ?< ? ?ĂŶĚ ?:ĂĐŽďƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?DŝĚĚůĞ^ƚŽŶĞŐĞ
Shell beads from South Africa. Science 304. 404. 
Hensilwood, C. S., and C. S. Maraen. 2003. The Origin of Modern Human Behaviour: Critique of the 
models and their test implications. Current Anthropology 44: 5. 627-51. 
Henshilwood, C. S., 2007. Fully symbolic Sapiens behavious: Innovations in the Middle Stone Age at 
Blombos Cave, South Africa, in Re-thinking the human revolution, eds. P. Mellars, K. Boyle, O. Bar-
Yosef and C. Stringer. 123-132. Cambridge: McDonald Institute Monographs.   
Hill, K. 2002. Altruistic cooperation during foraging by the Ache, and the evolved human 
predisposition to cooperate. Human Nature 13. 105-128. 
Hobson, P. 2004. The Cradle of Thought: Exploring the Origins of Thinking. New York: Oxford 
University Press.  
Hrdy, S. 2009. Mothers and Others: The Evolutionary Origins of Mutual Understanding. Harvard Univ 
Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Hublin, J.  WJ. 2009. The Prehistory of Compassion, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
106, 16, 6429-6430 
Hublin, J., Spoor, F., Braun, M., Zonneveld, F., and S. Condemi. 1996. A late Neanderthal associated 
with Upper Palaeolithic artifacts. Nature 381. 224. 
:ĞŶƐĞŶ ?< ? ?,ĂƌĞ ? ? ?Ăůů ?: ? ?ĂŶĚD ?dŽŵĂƐĞůůŽ ? ? ? ? ? ?tŚĂƚ ƐŝŶŝƚĨŽƌŵĞ ?^ĞůĨ-regard precludes 
altruism and spite in chimpanzees. Proceedings of the Royal Society B 273. 1013-1021. 
Jones, S. 1997. The Archaeology of Ethnicity, Constructing Identities in the Past and Present. London: 
Routledge.  
Kaplan, H., Hill, K., Lancaster, J., and Hurtado, M. 2000. A theory of human life history evolution: Diet, 
Intelligence and Longevity, Evolutionary Anthropology 9 (4). 156-85. 
Kamptner, N. L. 1991, Personal possessions and their meanings: A life-span perspective. Journal of 
Social Behavior & Personality 6(6), 209-228. 
Klein, R. G. 1999. The Human Career, Human Biological and Cultural Origins. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.  
Kuhn, S. L., Stiner, M.C., Reese, D. S., and E. Güleç. 2001. Ornaments of the Upper Palaeolithic: New 
Insights from the Levant. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 98 7641-7646 
Kuhn, S., and M. C. Stiner. 2007. Body ornamentation as information technology: towards an 
understanding of the significance of early beads, in Re-thinking the human revolution, eds. P. Mellars, 
K. Boyle, O. Bar-Yosef and C. Stringer. 45-54. Cambridge: McDonald Institute Monographs.  
Lamm, C., Batson, C. D. and J. Decety. 2007. The Neural Substrate of Human Empathy: Effects of 
Perspective-taking and Cognitive Appraisal. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 19:1, 42-58 
Lebel S, et al. (2001) Comparative morphology and paleobiology of Middle Pleistocene human 
ƌĞŵĂŝŶƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĂƵĚĞů ?ƵďĞƐŝĞƌ ?sĂƵĐůƵƐĞ ?&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?WƌŽĐEĂƚůĐĂĚ^Đŝh^ ? ? P ? ? ? ? ? W11102. 
Lebel, S., Trinkaus, E., Faure, M., Fernandez, P., Guérin, C., Richter, D., Mercier, N., Valladas, H., and G. 
A. Wagner. 2001. Comparative morphology and paleobiology of Middle Pleistocene human remains 
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĂƵĚĞ> ?ƵďĞƐŝĞƌ ?sĂƵĐůƵƐĞ ?&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 
98, 11097-11102. 
Lehmann, L., and L. Keller. 2006. The evolution of cooperation and altruism  W a general framework 
and a classification of models. Journal of Evolutionary Biology 19: 5. 1365-1376. 
Lemche, E., Giampietro, V P., Surguladze, S. A., Amaro E. J., Andrew, C.M., Williams, S. C.R., Brammer 
M. l J., Lawrence N., Maier M.A., Russell T. A., Simmons A., Ecker C., Joraschky P., Phillips M. L. 2006. 
Human attachment security is mediated by the amygdala: Evidence from combined fMRI and 
psychophysiological measures. Human Brain Mapping 27, 8, 623-635 
LiPuma, E., 1998. Modernity and forms of personhood in Melanisia. In Bodies and Persons: 
comparative perspectives from Africa and Melanesia, editted by M. Lambeck and A. Strathern, pp 53-
79. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Lordkipanidze, D., Vekua, A., Ferring, R., Rightmire, G. P., Agusti, J., Kiladze, G., Mouskhelishveli, A., 
Nioradze, M., Ponce de León, M. S., Tappen, M. and C. P. E. Zollikofer. 2005. Anthropology: The 
earliest toothless human skull. Nature 434. 717-718.  
Mauss, M. 1990 (1922). The Gift: forms and functions of exchange in archaic societies. London: 
Routledge.  
Manchester, K. 1987. Skeletal evidence for health and disease, in Death, decay, and reconstruction: 
Approaches to archaeology and forensic science. Edited by A. Boddington, A. N. Garland, and R. C. 
Janaway, pp. 163 W79. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Marquet, J.C. and M. Lorblanchet. 2003. A Neanderthal face? The proto-figurine from La Roche-
Cotard, Langeais (Indre-et-Loire, France). Antiquity 77. 661-670. 
Marwick, B. 2003. Pleistocene Exchange Networks as Evidence for the Evolution of Language. 
Cambridge Archaeological Journal 13:1. 67-81. 
DĐƌĞĂƌƚǇ ?^ ? ?ĂŶĚ ?ƌŽŽŬƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚǁĂƐŶ ?ƚ PŶĞǁŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŽƌŝŐŝŶŽĨ
modern human behaviour. Journal of Human Evolution 39. 453-365. 
McCabe, K., Houser, D., Ryan, L, Smith, V., Trouard, R .2001. A functional imaging study of cooperation 
in two-person reciprocal exchange, in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 98. 11832-
11835.  
McNabb, J. 2007 The British Lower Palaeolithic; Stones in Contention. Routledge. Abingdon. 
Mellars, P. 1989. Major Issues in the Emergence of Modern Humans, Current Anthropology  30: 3. 
349-385. 
Mellars, P. 1990. The Emergence of Modern Humans: an archaeological perspective. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press. 
Mellars, P. 2005.The impossible coincidence. A single-species model for the origins of modern human 
behavior in Europe, Evolutionary Anthropology  14: 1. 12 W27. 
Mellars, P. 2007. Rethinking the Human Revolution: Eurasian and African Perspectives, in Rethinking 
the human revolution eds. P. Mellars, K. Boyle, O. Bar-Yosef and C. Stringer,  1-14. Cambridge: 
McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research. 
Mikulincer, M and P. R. Shaver. 2001. Attachment theory and intergroup bias: Evidence that priming 
the secure base schema attenuates negative reactions to out-groups. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 81. 97-115. 
Mikulincer, M and P. R. Shaver. 2005a. Attachment Security, compassion and altruism. American 
Psychological Society 14: 1. 34-38. 
Mikulincer, M and Shaver, P. R. 2005b. Attachment theory and emotions in close relationships: 
Exploring the attachment-related dynamics of emotional reactions to relational events, Personal 
Relationships 12, 149-168 
Mikulincer, M, Shaver, P. R., Gillath, O. and R. A. Nitzberg. 2005. Attachment, Caregiving and Altrusim: 
Boosting Attachment security increases attachment and helping. Journal of Personal and Social 
Psychology 89: 5. 817-39. 
Mikulincer, M. Gillath, O., Halevy, V., Avihou, N., Avidan, S., and N. Eshkoli. 2001. Attachment theory 
ĂŶĚƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŽŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐŶĞĞĚƐ PǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚĂĐƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŽĨĂƚƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƉƌŽŵŽƚĞƐ
empathetic responses. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81. 1205-1224. 
Mikulincer, M., Gillath, O., Sapir-Lavid, Y., Yaakobi, E., Arias, K., Tal-Aloni, L., and G. Bor. 2003. 
ƚƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚƚŚĞŽƌǇĂŶĚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĨŽƌŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ǁĞůĨĂƌĞ PǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚĂĐƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƐĞĐƵƌĞ
base promotes endorsement of self-transcendence values. Basic and Applied Social Psychology 25. 
299-312. 
Miller, D. 2008. The Comfort of Things. Cambridge: Polity.  
Miller, S. C.; Kennedy, C., DeVoe, D., Hickey, M., Nelson, T., Kogan, L. 2009. An Examination of 
Changes in Oxytocin Levels in Men and Women Before and After Interaction with a Bonded Dog, 
Anthrozoos: A Multidisciplinary Journal of The Interactions of People & Animals 22, 1, pp. 31-42(12)  
Mithen, S. 2006. The Singing Neanderthals: The Origins of Music, Language, Mind and Body. London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 
Morris, J., and Preston-Whyte, E., 1994. Speaking with Beads: Zulu Arts from Southern Africa.Thames 
and Hudson, New York, p 55. 
Morsbach, H and Tyler, W. J. 1986. A Japanese emotion: amae. In R. Harr,e (ed). The social 
construction of emotion. New York: Basil Blackwell. 289-308  
Murphy, D. and S. Stich. 2000. Darwin in the Madhouse: evolutionary psychology and the 
classification of mental disorders. In Carruthers, P and Chamberlain, A. (eds) Evolution and the human 
mind, Modularity, Language and meta-cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 62-92. 
Nagasawa, M., Kikusui, T., Onaka, T., and Ohta, M., 2009. Dog's gaze at its owner increases owner's 
urinary oxytocin during social interaction, Hormones and Behaviour 55, 3, 434-441 
Nesse, R. M. 2001. Evolution and the Capacity for Commitment. New York: Russell Sage Foundation 
Series on Trust. 
Nettle, D., 2006. The evolution of personality variation in humans and other animals, American 
Psychologist 61, 6, 622-631. 
K ?ŽŶŶĞůů:& ?,ĂǁŬĞƐ< ?ůƵƌƚŽŶ:ŽŶĞƐE' ? ? ? ? ? ?'ƌĂŶĚŵŽƚŚĞƌŝŶŐ and the evolution of Homo erectus. 
Journal of Human Evolution 36:461 W 485.  
Ochsner, K. N., Knierim, K., Ludlow, D. H., Hanelin, J., Ramachandran, T., Glover, G. and S. C. Mackey. 
2004. Reflecting upon Feelings: An fMRI Study of Neural Systems Supporting the Attribution of 
Emotion to Self and Other. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience  16: 10. 1746-1772. 
Odendaal, J.S.J and Meintjes, R. A. 2003. Neurophysiological correlates of affiliative behaviour 
between humans and dogs, The Vetinary Journal 165, 3, 296-301 
Panter-Brick C. 2002. Sexual division of labor: energetic and evolutionary scenarios. American Journal 
of Human Biology 14:627 W640. 
Parkinson, B., Fischer, A.H. and A. S. R. Manstead. 2005. Emotion in Social Relations. New York: 
Psychology Press. 
Parrott, W. G. 2001. Emotions in Social Psychology: Essential Readings. Ann Arbor: Psychology Press.  
Pettitt, P. B. 2002. The Neanderthal Dead: exploring mortuary variability in Middle Palaeolithic 
Eurasia. Before Farming 1:4. 1-19. 
Plummer, T., 2004. Flaked stones and old bones: Biological and cultural evolution at the dawn of 
technology, Yearboook of Physical Anthropology 47: 118-164 
Reddy, W. M. 2001. The navigation of feeling: A framework for the history of the emotions, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Riel-Salvatore, J and G. A. Clark. 2001. Grave Markers: Middle and Early Upper Palaeolithic burials and 
the use of chronotypology in contemporary Paleolithic research. Current Anthropology 42: 4. 449-479 
Roberts, M and S. Parfitt. 1998. Boxgrove: A Middle Pleistocene Hominid Site at Eartham Quarry, 
Boxgrove, West Sussex. London: English Heritage. 
Rose L. 2001. Meat and the early human diet. In: Stanford CB, Bunn HT, editors. Meat-eating and 
human evolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p 141 W159. 
Rutherford, H. 2007. A Study on the Presence of Care-Giving in Neanderthals and an Examination of 
the Motivations Behind Such Behaviours, dissertation submitted for BSc degree, Department of 
Archaeology, University of York.  
Sachs, J. L., Mueller, U. G., Wilcox, T. P. and J. J. Bull. 2004. The evolution of cooperation. Quarterly 
Review of Biology 79. 135-160. 
Schild R. 2006. The killing fields of Zwolén: a Middle Paleolithic kill-butchery-site in central Poland. 
Warsaw: Institute of Archaeology and Ethnology, Polish Academy of Sciences 
Scott, K.. 1980. Two hunting episodes of Middle Palaeolithic age at La Cotte de St Brelade, Jersey, 
World Archaeology 12: 2. 137-152. 
Shang, H., and E. Trinkaus. 2008. An ectocranial lesion on the Middle Pleistocene human cranium 
from Hulu Cave Nanjing, China. American Journal of Physical Anthropology 135. 431-437. 
Silk, J. B., Brosnan, S. F., Vonk, J., Heinrich, J., Povinelli, D. J., Richardson, A. S., Lambeth, S. P., 
Mascaro, J. and S. J. Shapiro. 2005. Chimpanzees are indifferent to the welfare of group members. 
Nature 437. 1357-1359. 
Soeresen, S., Webster, J. D., and Roggman, L. A. 2002. Adult attachment and preparing to provide care 
for elderly relatives. Attachment and Human Development 4, 84-106 
Solecki, R. S. 1972. Shanidar: the humanity of Neanderthal man. London: Allen Lane the Penguin 
Press.   
Spikins, P. 2008. The Boastful and the Bashful: Leadership in Mesolithic societies, Journal of World 
Prehistory 21, 3-4, 173-193 
Spikins, P. 2009. Autism, the integrations of difference and the emergence of modern human 
behaviour, Cambridge Archaeological Journal 19:2 179-201 
Storm RA (2007) High Prevalence of Premature Craniosynostosis in the Medieval Hospital of St. James 
and St. Mary Magdalene, Chichester, England, Seventy-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American 
Association of Physical Anthropologists, March 28 W31, 2007, Philadelphia, PA, p 226.) 
Strathern, M. 1988. The gender of the gift: problems with women and problems with society in 
Melanesia. University of California Press, Berkeley.  
Suzuki,  S., and  E. Akiyama. 2007. Evolution of compassion under un-repeated interaction, in 
Advancing Social Simulation: The First World Congress, eds. S. Takahashi, D. Sallach, and J. Rouchier. 
173-81. Japan: Springer. 
Tarlow, S., 2000. Emotion in Archaeology, Current Anthropology 41: 5. 713-30. 
Testart, A., 1998. 'Uncertainties of the 'Obligation to Reciprocate': A Critique of Mauss' in Marcel 
Mauss: A Centenary Tribute. James, W. and Allen, N. J. (eds.). New York: Berghahn Books. 
Tilley, C., 1990. Reading Material Culture, Blackwell: Oxford.  
Tomasello, M., Call, J., and B. Hare. 2003. Chimpanzees understand psychological states  W the 
questions is which ones and to what extent. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7. 153-6. 
Trinkaus, E and M. R. Zimmerman. 1982. Trauma among the Shanidar Neanderthals. American Journal 
of Physical Anthropology 57: 1. 61-76. 
Trinkaus, E. 2007. Human Evolution: Neanderthal genes speak out. Current Biology 17. R917-919. 
Trivers, R. L., 1971. The evolution of reciprocal altruism, The Quarterly Review of Biology 46: 1. 35-57. 
Tucker, D. M. Luu, P. and D. Derryberry. 2005. Love hurts: The evolution of empathic concerní through 
the encephalisation of nociceptive capacity, Development and Psychopathology 17. 699-713. 
Turnbull, C. 1965. Wayward Servants. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode. 
Vanhaeren, M.,  ?ƌƌŝĐŽ ?& ? ?^ƚƌŝŶŐĞƌ ? ? ?:ĂŵĞƐ ?^ ?> ? ?dŽĚĚ ?: ? ?ĂŶĚ, < DŝĞŶŝƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?DŝĚĚůĞ
Paleolithic shell beads in Israel and Algeria.  Science 312: 5781. 1785-88. 
Walker, A., and P. Shipman. 1996. The wisdom of bones: In search of human origins. London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson.  
Walker, A., Zimmerman, M. R., and R. E. F. Leakey. 1982. A possible case of hypervitaminosis A in 
Homo erectus. Nature 296: 248-250. 
Wallendorf, M and Arnould, E. J. 1988. 'My favourite things': A cross-cultural inquiry into object 
attachment, possessiveness and social linkage, Journal of Consumer Research 14, 531. 
Warneken, F., Hare., B., Melis, A. P., Hanus, D., Tomasello, M (2007). Spontaneous altruism by 
chimpanzees and young children. PLos Biology 5, 7, 1414-1420. 
Weisfeld, G. E., and P. LaFreniere. 2007. Emotions, not just decision-making processes, are critical to 
an evolutionary model of human behaviour, Behavourial and Brain Sciences 30: 43-4. 
Weiner, A. B. 1992. Inalienable possessions: the paradox of keeping-while-giving. Berkeley: University 
of California Press.  
White, R. 2007. Systems of personal ornamentation in the Early Upper Palaeolithic: Methodological 
challenges and New Observations, in Re-thinking the Human Revolution, eds. P. Mellars, K. Boyle, O. 
Bar-Yosef and C. Stringer. McDonald Institute Monographs. Cambridge. 287-302. 
tŚŝƚĞ ?Z ? ? ? ? ? ? ?dĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƐŽĨ ‘ĂƵƌŝŐŶĂĐŝĂŶĂŐĞ ?ďŽĚǇŽƌŶĂŵĞŶƚƐĂĐƌŽƐƐ
Europe, in Before Lascaux: the complete record of the early upper Palaeolithic, eds. H. Knecht, A. Pike-
Tay, and R. White. Boca Raton. CRC press. 277-300. 
Wulff, H., 2007. The Emotions: A Cultural Reader. Oxford: Berg.  
Zeelenberg, M., Nelissen, R. M. A., Seger, M., Breugelmans, S. M., and R. Pieters. 2008. On emotion 
specificity in decision-making: Why feeling is for doing. Judgment and Decision Making 3: 1. 18-27. 
Zilhão, J., 2007. The Emergence of Ornaments and Art: An archaeological perspective on the origins of 
 ‘ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĂůŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƚǇ ? ?Journal of Archaeological Research 15: 1-54. 
  
 
 
   
   
  
